This monthly review, produced by IOM, provides a summary of news related to the implementation of the peace accord in Colombia, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes. Also included are statics on people in the process of reintegration and former child soldiers, the former of which are sourced from the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), and the latter from the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).

**FIGURES & TRENDS**

**Disengaged Children & Adolescents**

**Total 6,394**

*These data are estimates based on the information available

1. **Armed Group**
   - FARC 3840 (60%)
   - AUC 1055 (16%)
   - ELN 1093 (18%)
   - BACRIM 1271 (20%)
   - Other 312 (5%)

2. **Gender**
   - Male 4515 (71%)
   - Female 1879 (29%)

3. **Ethnicity**
   - Indigenous 3325 (51%)
   - Afro-Colombian 1708 (26%)
   - Not Yet Part of Program 105 (16%)
   - In Process 54 (8%)
   - Successfully Completed 369 (56%)

4. **Age**
   - 10 years 17 (2%)
   - 11 years 32 (5%)
   - 12 years 121 (20%)
   - 13 years 272 (44%)
   - 14 years 127 (20%)
   - 15 years 46 (7%)
   - 16 years 107 (17%)
   - 17 years 42 (7%)
   - 18 years 27 (4%)

5. **Victims of Forced Recruitment**
   - Total 8,435**/ Month to month 53**
   - Number of cases of child recruitment reported to the Victims Unit.

6. **Area of Relocation**
   - Top 8 Departments
     - Antioquia 12,180
     - Bogota D.C. 5,728
     - Cordoba 3,379
     - Valle del Cauca 3,371
     - Cesar 3,993
     - Santander 3,093
     - Magdalena 2,664

Data up to September 30, 2017

**Demobilized Adults**

**Total 59,562**

7. **ACR Participants**
   - Not Able to Locate 5,778 (10%)
   - Not Yet Part of Program 14,435 (24%)
   - Formally Removed 18,960 (32%)
   - Successfully Completed 11,721 (20%)

8. **Accomplished Demobilization**

Figure 6: The eight departments to which the highest numbers of ex-combatants were relocated.

Figure 7: Demobilized Adults

Figure 8: Total number of demobilized adults by ethnicity. Sources for Figures 5-7: ICBF Database and ACR Reintegration Information System (SIR)

Figure 9: Accumulated Demobilization
The United Nations announced on September 15th that weapons cache extraction in Colombia was complete. In all, they were able to remove and/or destroy 750 of the 998 caches with information provided by the FARC, and will be reporting on why they were unable to attend to the remaining 248. The operations occurred through collaboration between members of the FARC and international observers, with security and logistical support provided by the Armed Forces.¹

The second U.N. verification mission began on Tuesday, September 26th. This second phase will be responsible for monitoring the security guarantees for the former guerrillas as well as their reintegration processes (points 3.2 and 3.4 of the final accord), and will comprise 120 largely civilian international observers.² The second mission will maintain the same presence in the territories that the first one had, though some of the current transitional zones will be moved to more centralized, easy to access sites.³

The Pope visited Colombia September 6-11 and travelled to three cities supporting the peace process, urging his followers, and Colombians in general, to forgive and reconcile. Among the central themes in his mass of over 1.5 million attendees in the Simon Bolivar park in Bogota, and during his national prayers for reconciliation and for victims of the armed conflict in Villavicencio and Medellin, were calls for recognizing the truth of the acts committed over the last half century. He urged Colombians not to be afraid to ask for and offer forgiveness, to heal, and the renounce cycles of vengeance and violence.⁴

On Tuesday, September 26th, the Selection Committee for the JEP announced the 51 magistrates who would comprise the transitional justice mechanism. Among the list of the selected individuals are Ex-Minister of Justice, Yesid Reyes, and Ex-Magistrate of the Constitutional Court and Ex-Director of the Research Unit of the Attorney General’s Office, Alejandro Ramelli. These individuals, along with their 49 colleagues, will be responsible for judging the most significant atrocities of the armed conflict: crimes against humanity and war crimes, as stipulated by the final legal framework of the JEP. Mirtha Patricia Linares Prieto will be the first president of the tribunal.⁵

On Tuesday, September 12th, Ministry of Defense, Luis Carlos Villegas, announced that the Armed Forces of Colombia have already forcibly eradicated 62% of the 50,000 hectares of coca crops scheduled for destruction this year. The total goal between forced eradication and crop substitution for the year totals 100,000 hectares. Roughly 8,000 uniformed soldiers are working on the forced eradication process.⁶

Another FARC member was assassinated in Tumaco after being pardoned. Luis Hermínssul Guadí Hinestroza had gained his freedom just two days before his murder. The FARC leadership has pointed the finger at paramilitary expansion in the region, and connects the incident with other social leader assassinations, which have totaled 101 between January and August of this calendar year.⁷ Earlier in the month, a known commander of the FARC, Édgar Mesías Salgado Aragón (alias, Rodrigo Cadete), escaped his bodyguards in the department of Caquetá and fled. “Rodrigo Cadete” was a close associate of now deceased “Mono Jojoy” and was the commander of the 27th Front of the guerrilla group.⁸

¹ https://colombia.unmissions.org/la-mision-de-la-onu-finaliza-actividades-de-extraccion-de-caletas-y-dejacion-de-armas-de-las-farc-ep
⁵ http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/magistrados-de-la-justicia-especial-para-la-paz-134714
⁶ http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/balance-de-sustitucion-de-cultivos-ilicitos-en-colombia-con-acuerdo-de-paz-129978
⁸ http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-y-derechos-humanos/huyo-excomandante-de-las-farc-AA7277772
Representatives from the Government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN) announced early on September 4th that the two parties had reached a temporary bilateral ceasefire agreement for the first time in the group’s 52-year history. The bilateral ceasefire marked the conclusion to the third round of talks between the two groups in Quito, Ecuador. It will take effect on October 1st and last for 102 days until January 12, 2018. The GoC has required of the ELN that they 1) end kidnapping practices, 2) cease attacks on infrastructure, 3) discontinue the practice of laying antipersonnel mines, and 4) no longer recruit minors into their ranks. For its part, the GoC has committed to 1) suspend all military actions against the group, 2) investigate and address the ongoing assassinations of social leaders, 3) more effectively address the other illegal armed groups in the country, and 4) improve the conditions and develop a humanitarian plan for the guerrilla prisoners currently in Colombian jails. Nonetheless, clashes continued in the department of Cauca between the Colombian Armed Forces and the guerrilla group, negatively impacting indigenous communities in the territory, and doing little to raise expectations leading into the ceasefire.

Colombian Chancellor, María Ángela Holguín, and Vice President and Minister of International Relations for Panama, Isabel de Saint Malo de Alvarado met mid-September in order to form a strategic shared plan for combatting narcotrafficking in the region. The leaders articulated their hopes that their efforts would complement those of the consumer countries for illegal drugs. At the same time, they strengthened their commitments to improving commerce and electric planning between the neighbor nations.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met in order to develop collaborative initiatives in areas such as science and tourism as Colombia transitions to a postconflict era. Notably, Netanyahu’s visit was the first time an Israeli prime minister visited Latin America. The relationship between the two countries has been largely military in nature to date, and the two leaders expressed optimism for new ways in which they might work together moving forward.

On September 25th the First Session of the House of Representatives approved the proposed 16 Special Peace Constituencies for the two legislative periods 2018-2022 and 2022-2026. The Special Legislative Procedures now pass to the final plenary debate for review. The Government has applied an “objective formula” for determining the 167 municipalities in which a second representative will serve to ensure the areas of the country most affected by the conflict have an additional representative throughout the next two electoral cycles. The additional candidates can only be nominated by victims organizations or others forms of social organizations (not political parties), and are intended to balance out historical power imbalances that contributed to conflict dynamics.

The Ministry of the Interior began a series of workshops on citizen oversight in the territories in the department of Meta. The “Training Workshops for Trainers on Social Control” represent a collaborative effort between the Ministry of the Interior, the Administrative Department of Public Functions (DAFP), the National Ombudsman’s Office, the Agency for Territorial Renewal (ART), and the National Comptroller. The objective of these workshops is to create an informed body of citizen oversight committees to monitor and exert social control over certain programs included within the peace accord in the regions of the country most affected by the armed conflict.

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4 http://www.univision.com/noticias/america-latina/el-ejercito-de-liberacion-nacional-afirma-que-ha-llegado-a-un-acuerdo-de-cease-el-fuego-conel-gobierno
8 http://www.mininterior.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/circunscripciones-de-paz-pasa-plenaria-de-camara
9 http://www.mininterior.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/ministerio-capacita-veedores-en-territorios-de-postconflicto
On September 13th, representatives from ethnic groups in Colombia spoke out against the fact that the GoC had still not made concrete strides in planning for the implementation of the ethnic component to Final Accord. Various leaders from national and territorial indigenous organizations, ministries, the National Planning Department, and international cooperation, among others, met to discuss the lackluster advances in the budgeting and legislative processes meant to scaffold the postconflict programs for Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations. The GoC has until October 6th to finalize the financing of this component of the accords, though the tense meeting led participants and observers to believe that it is unlikely the deadline will be met.¹⁴

The “Women and Peace” project develops strategic actions for preventing violence against women and strengthening their role in territorial peacebuilding. The Pasto installation of this initiative in September coordinated a talent competition for youth, titled “Gender Equity is my Best Grade.” In all, the participative pedagogical strategy involves representatives from local governments, international cooperation, and the education sector.¹⁵

The ELN guerrilla group has historically had a strong presence in five departments in particular in Colombia: Norte de Santander, Nariño, Cauca, Antioquia, and Chocó. This month, Pacifista, offered an analysis of topics of interest related to these regions during the three months of the GoC-ELN bilateral ceasefire, which has a start date of October 1st. Depending on the region, ELN clashes have tended to be with the Colombian Army, narcotrafficking organizations, or paramilitary organizations. Coca production will also be a core factor in shaping the dynamics of the ceasefire and the hoped for end of conflict with the guerrilla group. The report provides analysis on each region, along with an overall depiction of the ELN presence at the national level.¹⁶

The Foundation for Peace and Reconciliation released the results of its seven-year investigation into the developments following the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary group. They found that many of the old paramilitary structures were coopted for criminal gangs after the demobilization, and that the overall patterns of operations have changed over time from command-and-control vertical structures to network-based operations. Narcotrafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling, as well as more urban-centered common crime networks persist. Efforts to fully dismantle the second generation groups have been undermined by significant political and private sector relations. The report ends with eight strategies for finally dismantling these successor groups, including distinct justice mechanisms, alternative industry development in areas where illegal industries are strongest, and a concerted strategy in the region to combat transnational criminal networks.¹⁷

¹⁴ http://pacifista.co/indigenas-y-afros-estan-a-punto-de-quedarse-por-fuera-de-la-paz/
¹⁵ http://nacionesunidas.org.co/blog/2017/09/26/la-igualdad-de-genero-es-mi-mejor-nota/
¹⁶ http://pacifista.co/cinco-regiones-del-pais-donde-el-cese-al-fuego-con-el-eln-puede-ser-fragil/
¹⁷ http://www.pares.com.co/paz-y-posconflicto/las-bandas-criminales-y-el-postconflicto/