




INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR PEACE

INTRODUCTION

As the Colombian peace talks progress, the government is also preparing institutions and infrastructure to implement a possible final peace agreement. According to the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, the infrastructure for peace (IFP) includes “multi-level and long-term investments targeted at building capacities and structures” to: prevent and resolve violent conflicts; support and guarantee peace accord implementation; and remove the structural causes of armed conflict.ⁱ This spotlight focuses on infrastructure that consolidates the capacities and structures to implement a peace agreement and create local conditions that serve the goal of sustaining peace in the long term. The document examines international and national cases that can serve Colombia in this phase of preparation for post-conflict.

NEPAL

Nepal’s civil war began in 1996 between King Gyanendra’s government and Maoist rebels, and culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in November 2006. Democracy was established in 2006, with the election of a Prime Minister and the creation of a new government without monarchy. With the signing of the CPA in 2006, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MPR) was created, tasked with: coordinating national peace efforts; overseeing implementation of the peace agreement; and creating local peace committees, a peace fund, and transitional justice mechanisms. This graph shows the Nepal IFP:ⁱⁱ



The MPR was part of a larger IFP that included international actors and a top-down mandate that did not allow for local actors to influence policy or programs.

Instead, implementation was guided by centralized design and leadership that failed to reflect local contextual variation. Also, most of the bodies in Nepal’s IFP operate with little coordination, and their mandates limited their scope to implement policy and prevent new violence.ⁱⁱⁱ

SOUTH AFRICA



Efforts to end apartheid peacefully in South Africa began in 1990, involving the then-ruling National Party, the African National Congress and civil society organizations. The National Peace Accord, signed in 1991, established a Peace Secretariat, which in turn created a national peace committee with representatives of all of the NPA signatories, 11 regional peace committees and 260 local committees. The goal of these committees was to mitigate the violence that had broken out nationwide in 1991.^{iv}

The coordination between the national peace committee and its regional and local counterparts was one key to their success. The national committee set guidelines for local committees to follow, and these guidelines gave room for flexibility and adaptation to local contexts. The regional peace committees also had a clear role in forming national-level priorities and policies. Top-down support to local-level processes through clear lines of communication was very important in South Africa, while maintaining flexible local mandates able to adapt to specific, local contexts.^v

GUATEMALA

Civil war broke out in Guatemala 1960, in which various guerrilla groups were formed, which eventually grouped together in the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in 1982. The military effectively held power between 1978 and 1983, and was charged with carrying out genocide against the country’s Mayan peoples. In 1987, secret negotiations began and a peace accord was signed in 1996 by the Guatemalan government and the URNG, which included six substantive and five operational accords, with 13 agreements and 400 commitments.

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A support commission was created as the highest body to facilitate implementation of these accords. The commission was comprised of two representatives from the government, two from the URNG, one from Congress, and four notable citizens, with the UN Mission head as an observer. A Secretary of Peace was created but not given decision-making power. In the end, actual implementation depended on the government and Congress, due to the fact that they held the power over both bodies.^{vi}



Analysts largely attribute the non-implementation of many components of the Guatemalan peace accords to two factors: 1) the State was completely in charge of implementing the peace agreement with no decision making power afforded to other bodies; and 2) the accords were written in vague and noncommittal language.^{vii} A 1999 referendum that intended to ratify parts of the peace accords did not pass, leading the government to abandon many commitments. This shows that if there is no political will, peace accords will not be implemented, and the power given to the IFP highly influences the extent of implementation of agreements.


COLOMBIA

During the peace processes in the 1990s, institutional architecture was limited to managing the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Colombia created the National Peace Council (NPC) for the Caguán Peace Process (1999-2002), the main purpose of which is to advise and present proposals to the State on peace-related issues. The design of the NPC was tailored to the participatory nature of the Caguán process.^{viii} The NCP was reactivated in October 2014 for the current peace process with the FARC, and it seems that the GOC plans to use it for the implementation of a final peace agreement, although the details of this use are still not defined.

However, in the decade following the start of AUC demobilizations, institutions have been adjusted and created to take on a wider gamut of post-conflict tasks. These institutions include: the ACR and its predecessors; the Justice and Peace Unit in the Attorney General's Office; the Center for Historical Memory and the Victims' and Land Restitution Units.

As a result of the current peace process, various new entities will be created, including the Strategic Transition Command (part of the armed forces) and a Ministry of Post-Conflict to coordinate the implementation of the agreements and other peacebuilding initiatives. According to the topics included in the process agenda (1) Integral rural development; 2) political participation; 3) the end of the conflict; 4) solution to the problem of illegal drugs; 5)

victims; 6) implementation, verification, and referendum) and the partial agreements on points 1,2, and 4, the IFP that includes the Command, the Ministry, and others related to the agreements are expected to be structured as follows, taking into account the importance of regional implementation supported at the national level:



CONCLUSION

These cases have many important lessons for Colombia. A national-level IFP must have the power and capacity to implement peace agreements, although as shown by Nepal and South Africa, there must be a balance between design at the national level and regional and local capacity to adapt to specific contexts. In addition, IFPs can only implement peace agreements effectively if they have the power to do so, as shown by Guatemala. Coordination between the organisms involved in the implementation of peace is essential to guarantee the best possibilities of success. This is especially important in areas such as rural development and illegal drugs, which are inter-related. Careful planning and practice of an IFP in Colombia will be essential to guarantee the sustainability of peace in the post-conflict phase and in the long term.

ⁱ Journal of Peacebuilding & Development. 2012. "The Evolving Landscape of Infrastructures for Peace." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7(3):1-7.

ⁱⁱ Suurmond, J. and Sharma, P.M.. 2013. "Serving People's Need for Peace: Infrastructures for Peace, the Peace Sector and the Case of Nepal." <http://bit.ly/123JKDj> Modifications realized by IOM. Gray boxes indicate that the institutions had still not been created at the time of writing.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid.

^{iv} Pp. 117-118, van Tongeren, P. 2013. "Creating Infrastructures for Peace – Experiences at Three Continents." www.i4pinternational.org/files/341/vantongeren+creating.pdf

^v Odendaal, A. 2011. "An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level: A Comparative Study of Local Peace Committees." <http://bit.ly/15HNaO5>

^{vi} Álvarez, E. and Prado, T. 2002. "Guatemala's Peace Process: Context, Analysis and Evaluation." <http://bit.ly/1vWcb3M>

^{vii} Pp. 123, Stanley, William D. 2007. "Business as Usual? Justice and Policing Reform in Postwar Guatemala." In *Constructing Justice and Security After War*. Charles Call (Ed.) United States Institute for Peace: Washington D.C.

^{viii} Pp. iv, Unger, B. and Lundström, S. 2013. "On Framing, Setting Up and Supporting Peace Infrastructures." In Unger, B, Lundström, S, Planta, K and Austin, B (Eds.) 2013. *Peace Infrastructures: Assessing Concept and Practice*. Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series. <http://bit.ly/1w0imgM>